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Respect for human rights begins with the way society treats its
children.1
I. INTRODUCTION

Until recently, California law was clear in cases where an adoption was being contested by an unwed biological father: Judges were
instructed to act in the best interests of the child.2 In February of 1992,
the California Supreme Court changed the rules.
In Adoption of Kelsey S.,1 the court held that if an unwed father
contesting an adoption arranged by the child's mother promptly
comes forward and "demonstrates a full commitment to his parental
responsibilities-emotional, financial, and otherwise-his federal
constitutional right to due process[4 ] prohibits the termination of his
parental relationship absent a showing of his unfitness as a parent."5
The court believed that unless the father was unfit, continuing the father's parental relationship best served the child's interests.6
This decision changed the balance of interests the California
courts traditionally weighed. The motive behind the Kelsey S. ruling
was to reward unwed biological fathers who act responsibly. 7 But it is
the children who bear the cost of this "reward" due to the court's
express creation of an exception to the traditional "best interests of
the child" standard.8 As a result of Kelsey S., courts now must first
consider the biological father's rights before considering the child's
welfare.
1. UNrrED NATIONS CENTRE FOR HuMAN RIoHrs, GENEVA, HUMAN RoHS FACT
SHEET No. 10, THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 1 (1990) [hereinafter UNrTED NATIONS
CENTRE].
2. CAL. Civ. CODE § 7017(d)(2) (West 1993) (The court "may consider all relevant

evidence, including the efforts made by the father to obtain custody, the age and prior
placement of the child, and the effects of a change of placement on the child."). This code
section has remained unchanged since the outcome of Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th
816, 823 P.2d 1216, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615 (1992), and is now located in California Family
Code § 7664(b). See CAL.FAm.CODE § 7664(b) (West 1994).
3. 1 Cal. 4th 816, 823 P.2d 1216, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615 (1992).
4. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (defining due process rights as requiring
procedural protection of parent's interest in care, companionship, and custody of his or her
children). The Due Process Clause can be found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. "There are two aspects:
procedural, in which a person is guaranteed fair procedures and substantive which protects
a person's property from unfair governmental interference or taking." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 500 (6th ed. 1990). See infra text accompanying notes 46-61.
5. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
6. Id.
7. John Johnson, A Question of Rights, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 4, 1992, at B3.
8. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
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Adoption custody disputes involve balancing the best interests of
a child, the rights of adoptive parents, and the sometimes dubious
claims of a biological parent who may have done little for the child
since birth, or even since conception.' Kelsey S. elevates biological
parents' interests over the rights of both adoptive parents and children. As a result, California adoption law has taken a giant step backward from primarily considering the best interests of the child. By not
restricting the focus of the court to considering primarily the best interests of the child first, the Kelsey S. holding merely encourages the
use of children as pawns in a custody game played out by adults. 10
While a biological father in an adoption contest is entitled to
equal protection," this Note argues that courts should not stress a father's constitutional rights at the expense of a child's best interests.
Instead, courts should place the child's interests first. Part II of this
Note discusses the development of the laws surrounding adoption custody proceedings. Part III outlines the facts of Kelsey S. and the trial
court's findings. Part IV examines the California Supreme Court's
reasoning and explains why it reversed the trial court's ruling. Part V
argues that the California Supreme Court erred in putting the biological father's rights ahead of the child's rights. Instead a child's psychological bond to his or her adoptive parents should be the paramount
factor in determining the proper adoption test-namely, the best interests of the child. Finally, Part VI concludes that the court should
primarily consider this psychological bondfirst when making its determuination of who receives custody in the best interests of the child.
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A.

History of Adoption

Legal adoption does not exist in the common law; it is a purely
statutory creation.12 While early adoption was used, for example, in
ancient Rome as a means to secure an heir in order to strengthen or
9. The Child Has an Interes4 Too, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993, at B6.
10. During any custody dispute the process is "regrettably and undeniably a zero-sum
contest. The child is the prize. One contestant wins; one contestant loses." In re Jasmon
0., 8 Cal. 4th 398, 436, 878 P.2d 1297, 1318, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85, 106 (1994) (Baxter, J.,
dissenting).

11. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972); Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d
at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
12. BLAc 's LAW DICrIONARY 49 (6th ed. 1990); see also Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 856 (1977) (stating that in foster care custody dispute, were it
not for state's creation and maintenance of foster care program, relationship for which
constitutional protection was asserted would not even exist).
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extend a family line, adoption did not exist in the Anglo-Saxon tradition.' 3 English Common Law recognized neither the fight to adopt
nor the right to be adopted. 4 Adoption laws began in the United
States in the late nineteenth century when the colonial practices of
apprenticeship and5 indenture became inadequate to provide for dependent children.'
The adoption process is now defined as the means by which a
parent-child relationship is established between persons petitioning to
adopt and the adoptee.' 6 Only recently have courts adopted the best
interests of the child standard in determining custody disputes. 17 Traditionally, the parental-rights doctrine was applied, in which the rights
of the parent were superior to those of the child. 8 Such parental
rights were closer to property rights than to the rights currently recognized in today's adoption cases.' 9 Previously, the superiority of parental rights extended to the rights of adoptive parents; any laws
concerning adoption were procedural, aimed at guaranteeing the contractual integrity of the transaction. 20 As one commentator noted,
"[f]rom Roman times to the mid-nineteenth century, [children] were
treated as something akin to property and had rights which might be
13. JEROME SMITH & FRANKLIN I. MIROFF,YoU'RE OUR CiLD: THE ADOMTON EXPERmNCE 2 (1987).

14. Id
15. Id.
16. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 49 (6th ed. 1990). Adoption is defined:
Legal process pursuant to state statute in which a child's legal rights and duties
toward his natural parents are terminated and similar rights and duties toward his
adoptive parents are substituted. To take into one's family the child of another
and give him or her the rights, privileges, and duties of a child and heir.
Id.
17. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,256, reh'gdenied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978) where
a woman's new husband was allowed to adopt her child because the child's biological father had forfeited his parental rights by not: (1) marrying the mother, or (2) seeking to
establish a relationship with the child. The Court essentially relied upon the best interests
test to permit the adoption where there was, in effect, no father in existence. See id at 251;
see also John L. Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the
Basisfor ParentalRights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353,364 (1991) (arguing that genetic relationship, in itself, should be accorded very little moral weight in determination of parental
status in surrogacy-adoption cases).
18. Hill, supra note 17, at 363.
19. Id at 363,418; see also Hillary Rodham, Children Underthe Law, 43 HARV. EDuc.
REv. 487, 488-91 (1973) ("Children were regarded as chattels of the family and wards of
the state, with no recognized political character or power and few legal rights.") Id. at 489.
20. SMrrH & MIROFF, supra note 13, at 2-3. Initially adoption laws were focused upon
the protection of the adoptive parent's rights. Procedures to protect them included sealing
the birth and adoption records, and issuing new birth certificates in the adoptive parents'
names. Id. at 3.
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characterized as falling somewhere between those of slaves and those
of animals."'"
B. Best Interests
The twentieth century brought great progressive reforms, including the increased importance of protecting children's health and welfare.22 Modem concern for children as individuals established both
the best interests- standard and the concept of parental fitness as limits
to the absolute parental-rights doctrine. 3 The best interests of the
child is now the standard that the United States Supreme Court considers to be of primary concern in cases where putative fathers assert
their parental rights?- 4 This standard focuses on what would serve the
best interests of the child rather than on the claims of the parties competing to become the custodial parents.' The "best interests" formula has been the foundation for adoption cases in our courts since 188126 and, as such, is a distinctly American contribution to the history of adoption law.27 The landmark case
of Chapsky v. Wood' adopted the best interests of the child standard
as the sole criterion for deciding child custody.2 9 The Chapsky court
decided that the father's right to custody of the child would "depend
mainly upon the question whether such custody will promote the welfare and interest of such child." 0 Since then, courts have reasoned
that the paramount consideration in awarding custody will be what
best promotes the child's welfare 31 Courts adhering to the best interests standard focus solely on the child with neither competing party
21. Cynthia P. Cohen, Relationships Between the Child, the Family and the State, in
THE FAMILY 293, 297 (Robert C.L. Moffat et al. eds., 1990).
22. SMrrH & MmoFu, supra note 13, at 3.
23. Hill, supra note 17, at 364.
24. See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, reh'g denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978).
25. Hill, supra note 17, at 363.
26. Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881).
27. SMrrH & MIROFF, supra note 13, at 14-15. While the best interests test began in
America, it is now considered of primary importance in other countries as well. UNIrED
NATIONS CENTmE, supra note 1, at 8, 15-16.
28. 26 Kan. 650 (1881).
29. Id. at 653-58. The Chapsky court ruled that the best interests of the child would be
promoted by comparing the prospective parents': (1) wealth; (2) social position; (3) health;
(4) educational advantages; (5) moral training; (6) ability to care for the child; and (7)
affection for the child. Id. at 655-57.
30. Id. at 653.
31. Christopher A. Jeffreys, Note, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in Child
Custody Resolution, 15 HoFsmA L. RFv.115,121 (1986). This is also true for adoption in
other United Nations countries. UNrED NA O NS C-NTRE, supra note 1, at 1, 15. "Inall
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare instituPERSPECTIVES ON
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bearing the burden of proof: Instead, each party must attempt to
show that granting them custody would be in the child's best
interests. 32
C. Best Interests Difficult to Apply
In determining best interests, each jurisdiction applies a "parental
presumption"-that placement of a child with his or her biological
parents is generally in the best interests of that child.33 However, in
some cases courts have acknowledged that the biological parents'
rights may conflict with the child's interests-for example, Parhamv.
J.R.-3 recognized that parents' rights are limited in cases of abuse and
neglect, since the presumption that parents act in the best interest of
that parthe child no longer applies.35 In these cases the presumption
36
apply.
not
does
child
the
of
interests
best
ents act in the
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act37 suggests that in determining best interests a court should consider all relevant factors,
including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his
custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his
parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who
may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved.38
It is difficult to apply these factors to a custody dispute involving an
infant since the child is usually too young to indicate his or her wishes.
In addition, the question of who is the "parent" is often the exact
tions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the
child shall be a primary consideration." l&L
32. Peggy Blotner, Third Party Custody and Visitation: How Many Ways Should We
Slice the Pie?, 1989 DEr. C.L. RPv. 163, 167 (1989).
33. Hill, supra note 17, at 364.
34. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
35. Other instances include cases where children are physically abused, mentally
abused, or neglected by their parents; where children choose a different religion from their
parents; where parents seek to alienate their children's property; or where parents seek to
withhold necessary medical treatment. Id. at 630-31.
36. This is particularly true in lengthy custody cases. See iL at 604.
37. UtNI. MARRIAGE & DrvORCE Acr § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1987).
38. Id.
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question being placed before the court attempting to make this best
interests determination.
In California, Division 8 of the Family Code, entitled "Custody of
Children,"39 requires a court to consider the health, safety, and welfare of the child, any history of abuse by a parent-whether against
the child or against another parent, the nature and amount of contact
with both parents, as well as any other relevant factors.' Again, this
standard is almost impossible to apply to cases of infant adoption: it
would be difficult to determine the future actions of any parties, and
neither party may have had the opportunity to have much contact
with the child.
D. Moving Away from Best Interests in Favor of Parent's
ConstitutionalRights
Prior to the Kelsey S. 4 1 decision, the United States Census Bureau issued a report called "Fertility of American Women," revealing
that for the most recent statistical year (July 1989 to June 1990) one in
every four births was out of wedlock.42 In Kelsey S., the California
Supreme Court recognized that the determination of an unwed parent's rights is of great concern. 43 With single parenthood and
pregnancies of unmarried partners occurring more frequently, these
issues are being increasingly addressed in the media. 44 Courts are no
longer able to ignore these issues. 45 The United States Supreme
Court has recently been forced to address many issues that in the past
were either too socially unacceptable to be publicly addressed, or involved such a small segment of the population that the issue never
reached the Court.
39. CAL. F

. CODE §§ 3000-3425 (West 1994).
40. Id. § 3022. This section was taken from the California Civil Code sections in place
at the time of Kelsey S. without substantive change. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4608 (1983).
41. 1 Cal. 4th 816, 823 P.2d 1216, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615 (1992).

42. I& at 830 n.6, 823 P.2d at 1223 n.6, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622 n.6 (citing United States
Census Bureau, Fertilityof American Women. June 1992).
43. Id.
44. The question of best interests of the child in adoption custody disputes has been a
focus of magazines, television dramas, and television talk shows. See, e.g., Terry O'Neill,
Special Report on Birthfather Rights, ADoro'nv FAMILIES, SeptJOct. 1994, at 8-12; L.A.
Law: She's MY Baby (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 17, 1994); Geraldo: My Baby...
Don't Take My Baby: Birth Parentsvs. Adoptive Parents (CBS television broadcast, Sept.

20, 1994).
45. Looking at a comparable group of never-married women 18 to 44 years old, 24%
had borne a child in 1992, compared to only 15% in 1982. United States Census Bureau,
Fertilityof American Women: June 1992, at xv.
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In Stanley v. Illinois46 the United States Supreme Court recognized that an unwed father who has developed a relationship with his
child has a constitutional interest in maintaining a continuing role in
the child's life.4 7 The Court left unanswered the question, however,
whether the biological father of a newborn, with whom the father has
not had the opportunity to develop a relationship, has a legal interest
in, and thus, the right to veto the adoption of his child. The Stanley
Court defined due process rights as requiring procedural protection of
a parent's interest in the care, companionship, and custody of his or
her child. 48
Six years later in Quilloin v. Walcott,49 the Court limited its holding in Stanley by finding that Georgia's application of the best interests of the child standard did not violate a biological father's due
process rights.5" The Court rejected the father's equal protection argument on the ground that he had "never exercised actual or legal
custody over his child, and,. .. never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protec'51
tion, or care of the child."
1 Approximately one year later, however, the Court invalidated a
New York statute, recognizing a biological father's equal protection
rights.52 The statute allowed a child to be adopted by its biological
mother and her husband without the biological father's consent. 53 In
1983, the Court addressed the amended version of this New York statute in Lehr v. Robertson.5 4 The amendment required that mothers of
illegitimate children notify the father of pending adoption proceedings
if the father has filed a notice of intent to claim paternity of the
child.55 This time the Court rejected the father's equal protection
claim. The Court relied on its rationale in Quilloin-that the existence of "a substantial relationship between parent and child is a relevant criterion in evaluating both the rights of the parent and the best
interests of the child."' 56 In Lehr, the father had never established a
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Id. at 649.
Id. at 651.
434 U.S. 246 (1978).
Id. at 256.
I
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
Id. at 385.

54. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
55. Id. at 250-51.
56. Id. at 266-67.
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relationship with the child.57 The Court therefore reasoned that the

biological parents were
not similarly situated for purposes of equal
58
analysis.
protection
In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,"I which is somewhat analogous to
Kelsey S., at least one Justice of the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged that biological fathers do have a protected liberty interest in their relationships with their children.' However, a majority of
the Justices also held that a biological father's attempt to establish a

relationship with his child is either a very important 6 ' or a determinative factor. 62
III. STATEMENT OF KELSEY S.-THE T IAL COURT
Kari S. gave birth to Kelsey on May 18,1988.63 She was not married to the child's natural father, Rickie M.1 The father objected to
Kari S.'s decision to place the baby for adoption because he wanted to
raise the child.65 On May 20, 1988, Rickie M. filed an action in the
Santa Clara County Superior Court seeking to establish his parental
relationship with Kelsey, and to obtain custody of the child.66 That

same day the court issued an order temporarily awarding him
custody.67

On May 24, 1988, the prospective adoptive parents, Steven and
Suzanne A., filed an adoption petition under California Civil Code
section 22668 alleging that they needed only the mother's consent to
adopt Kelsey as there was no "presumed
father" under California
69
Civil Code section 7004, subdivision (a).
57. Id at 267.
58. Id59. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
60. Id at 133 (Stevens, ., concurring).
61. Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 837, 823 P.2d at 1228, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 627.
62. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 142-43 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citing Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978); and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)); see Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 837,
823 P.2d at 1228, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627.
63. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 821, 823 P.2d at 1217, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616.
64. Id
65. Id.
66. Id. at 822, 823 P.2d at 1217-18, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 616-17.
67. Id., 823 P.2d at 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
68.

CAL.

Civ.

CODE

§ 226 (West 1982) (repealed 1991).

69. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 822,823 P.2d at 1218,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617; CAL.Crv. CODE
§ 7004(a) (West 1983) (repealed 1993) (asserting that male is presumed to be natural father
of child if he meets certain conditions). In this case the relevant condition would be if "he
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Two days later, the trial court modified its May 20 order and
awarded temporary custody to Kari S., prohibiting visitation by both
the prospective adoptive parents and the natural father.70 On May 31,
1988, the prospective adoptive parents filed a petition under California Civil Code section 701771 to terminate the natural father's parental
rights.7' The court consolidated this petition with the adoption proceedings, but decided to allow visitation with the child by both the
natural father and the prospective adoptive parents. 73
While the parties subsequently stipulated that Rickie M. was the
child's natural father, the court ruled that he was not a "presumed
father" within the meaning of California Civil Code section 7004, subdivision (a)(4).74 Under this provision of the Civil Code, a man becomes a presumed father if "[hie receives the child into his home and
openly holds out the child as his natural child." 75
The trial court held extensive hearings under California Civil
Code section 701776 to determine whether it would be in the child's
best interest to allow Rickie M. to retain his parental rights and
whether to allow the adoption to proceed.77 Although the child's attorney advocated that Rickie M. should retain his parental rights, 78
the court found that the child's best interests required termination of
Rickie M.'s parental rights.79
Rickie M. appealed, contending that the trial court erred by: (1)
concluding that he was not the child's presumed father;80 (2) not
granting him a parental placement preference;81 and (3) applying an
receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child." Id.
This provision is now codified without substantive change. See CAL. FAM. CoDE § 7611
(West 1994).

70. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 822, 823 P.2d at 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
71. CAL CIV. CODE § 7017(d) (West 1983) (repealed 1994) (current version at CAL
FAM. CODE

§ 7664 (West 1994)).

72. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 822-23, 823 P.2d at 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.

73. Id.
74. Id. at 823, 823 P.2d at 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
75. CAL Civ. CODE § 7004(a)(4) (West 1983) (repealed 1993) (current version at CAL
FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 1994)).
76. CAL CIV. CODE § 7017 (West 1983) (repealed 1994) (current version at CAL. FAM.
CODE §§ 7660-7666 (West 1994)).
77. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 823, 823 P.2d at 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
78. Id.

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. A parental placement preference is defined in California's Civil Code. CAL CiV.
CODE § 4600(c) (West 1983) (repealed 1994) (current version at CAL. Fm. CODE § 3041

(West 1994)).
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incorrect standard of proof.a

The Sixth District Court of Appeal re-

83
jected all three contentions and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

IV.

THE CALIFORNIA SuPREIiE COURT'S DIVISION OF KELsEY S.

A.

The Majority

On February 20,1992, the California Supreme Court reversed the
lower court. The court held that the federal constitutional guarantees
of equal protection 84 and due processu8 preclude the state from terminating an unwed father's parental rights on nothing more than a showing of the child's best interests. 6 The majority also concluded that
Civil Code section 7004-a provision of the Uniform Parentage
Act87-was unconstitutional as applied.88 Section 7004 provides that
a man is a presumed father of a child if he meets certain conditions
including: (1) he is either married to the child's mother, or (2) has
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons other
than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it shall make a finding that an
award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and the award to a
nonparent is required to serve the best interests of the child.
Id. (repealed 1994) (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041 (West 1994)).
82. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 823, 823 P.2d at 1218, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 617.
83. Id.
84. Equal protection guarantees that persons will not be denied rights, privileges, and
protections provided to others similarly situated. BLAcK's LAW DicnoNARY 537 (6th ed.
1990). The Equal Protection Clause "requires that persons under like circumstances be
given equal protection in the enjoyment of personal rights and the prevention and redress
of wrongs." Id. at 537 (citing In re Adoption of Richardson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 222, 239, 59
Cal. Rptr. 323, 334 (1967)).
85. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
86. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
87. CA. Crv. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West 1983) (repealed 1994) (current version at CA.
FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7730 (West 1994)); 9B U.L.A. 287-345 (1987 & Supp. 1994) (giving
parental rights in relationship to children). The Uniform Parentage Act has currently been
adopted by eighteen states: Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 26-17-1 to 26-17-21 (1992); California, CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7730 (West 1994); Colorado, COLO.REv. STAT. ANN. 99 194-101 to 19-4-129 (Bradford 1986); Delaware, DEL CODE ANN.tit. 13, §§ 801-818 (1993);
Hawaii, HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 584-1 to 584-26 (1985); Illinois, I. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para.
45/1-45/26 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §H 38-1110 to 38-1130 (1993);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN.H9 257.51-257.75 (West 1992); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 210.817 to 210.852 (1987); Montana, MoNT. CODE ANN. H9 40-6-101 to 40-6-135
(Vernon 1994); Nevada, NEv. REv. STAT. 99 126.011-126.391 (Michie 1991); New Jersey,
NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-38 to 9:17-59 (West 1993); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. H9 4011-1 to 40-11-23 (Michie 1994); North Dakota, N.D. Crr.CODE §§ 14-17-01 to 14-17-26
(1991); Ohio, Omo REv. CODE 99 3111.01-3111.19 (Anderson 1990); Rhode Island, R.I.
GEN. LAWS 1956 §9 15-8-1 to 15-8-27 (1988); Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 26.26.010-26.26.905 (West 1986); and Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to 14-2-120
(1977). 9B U.L.A. 287-345 (1987) and at 6 (Supp. 1994).
88. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
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attempted to marry the child's mother, (3) he has consented to be
named as the child's father on the child's birth certificate, or (4) he
"receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his
own." 89 A presumed father must consent to placing a child up for
adoption, as opposed to a "natural father" whose consent is unnecessary.90 The court found that the statute violated the federal constitutional guarantee of equal protection and due process for unwed
fathers, as it gives an unwed mother the power to unilaterally prevent
the biological father from attaining the status of presumed father.91
The problem is that in order to qualify as a presumed father, the biological father must receive the child into his home and openly hold the
child out as his natural child92-actions easily prevented or frustrated
by the biological mother.93
The court defined three classes of parents created by the statutory scheme: (1) mothers; (2) biological fathers who are presumed
fathers; and (3) biological fathers who are not presumed fathers (that
is, natural fathers).94 The "difficult constitutional question"'9 5 was
whether a naturalfather's federal constitutional rights are violated if
his child's biological mother is unilaterally allowed to preclude him
from obtaining the same legal right as a presumedfather-specifically,
the right to withhold consent to his child's adoption by third parties.96
Hence, the majority invoked the Equal, Protection Clause as the first
step in its analysis,' considering the best interests of the child only
after equal protection and due process have been satisfied. 98
The majority's concern focused on the court's treatment of the
natural father:
A natural father's consent to an adoption of his child by third
parties is not required unless the father makes the required
showing that retention of his parental rights is in the child's
best interest. Consent, however, is required of a mother and
a presumed father regardless of the child's best interest. The
89. Id
90. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7017(d) (repealed 1994) (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7664 (West 1994)).
91. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
92. CAL. Crv. CODE § 7004(a)(4) (repealed 1993) (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7611(d) (West 1994))..
93. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
94. Id. at 825, 823 P.2d at 1219, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618.
95. Id. at 830, 823 P.2d at 1223, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622.
96. Id.
97. Id at 826, 823 P.2d at 1220, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 619.
98. Id. at 850, 823 P.2d at 1237, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.
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natural father is therefore treated differently from both
mothers and presumed fathers.9 9
As a result, before his consent to an adoption is required, the natural
father must initially show that the child would be better off remaining
in his custody. As the majority clearly noted, however, the natural
father's consent is rarely needed because "the trial court's determination is frequently that the child's interests are better served by a third
party adoption than by granting custody to the unwed natural
father."°"co
Addressing this constitutional question, the California Supreme
Court held that California Civil Code section 7004 violated the federal
constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process for unwed fathers. 01 The court remanded the case to the trial court to decide whether the biological father's conduct-after learning that he
was the biological father-demonstrated a sufficient commitment to
his parental responsibilities." °
If the trial court determines that the commitment was not sufficient, the biological father has suffered no deprivation of his constitutional rights. 10 3 If the required commitment is found, however, the
biological father's constitutional rights were violated to the extent that
he was deprived of the same statutory protection granted to the
mother regarding the placement of the child for adoption. °4 In sum,
if the court feels the necessary commitment has been shown, absent a
showing of abandonment or unfitness, the biological father cannot be
deprived of his right to be consulted regarding the adoption of his
child.' 0 5
B. Justice Mosk's Dissent
In dissent, Justice Mosk stated that his concern for the child's
welfare prevented him from joining the majority."° He stated that it
is settled law that the court "should not reach constitutional questions
99. Id. at 825, 823 P.2d at 1219, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618.
100. Id. at 824, 823 P.2d at 1219, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618.
101. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
102. Id. at 850, 823 P.2d at 1237, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636. The court does not explicitly
state what would be necessary to demonstrate a full commitment to one's parental responsibilities. It merely refers to "responsibilities-emotional, financial, and otherwise." Id. at

849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 850, 823 P.2d at 1237, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636.
Id.
Id. at 850-51, 823 P.2d at 1237-38, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 636-37.
Id. at 852, 823 P.2d at 1239, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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unless absolutely required."''7 By invoking the Equal Protection
Clause, Justice Mosk believed the majority was attempting to justify
its result, and that it had ignored the potential ramifications of its reasoning.'08 Justice Mosk maintained that attempting to support a desired result "does not justify... throwing out the innocent baby with
the statutory bath water."1 9
Justice Mosk noticed that the majority's reasoning could lead to
"unfortunate results" in widespread cases.' 10 Citing Lehr v. Robertson," he proclaimed that the issue was a simple factual one: If a
biological father accepted responsibility for the child's future, then he
is entitled to the benefits of the parent-child relationship. 11 2 However,
if he fails to accept the responsibility, "the Federal Constitution will
not automatically compel a3State to listen to his opinion of where the
child's best interests lie.""1
Justice Mosk found the majority's reasoning unsound and fraught
with future dangers." 4 He concurred only with the result-reversing
the judgment of the court of appeal and remanding the case to the
trial court for further proceedings. 15 However, given his belief that
the majority's analysis could be injurious to children in other6adoption
custody disputes, he refused to join the court's reasoning."
Justice Mosk proposed that it was not necessary to address the
constitutional issue because an alternate legal solution existed." 7 By
applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel" 8 the court could determine if either the biological mother or the adoptive parents, or both,
were at fault in denying the biological father the chance to become a
107. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing People v. Williams, 16 Cal. 3d
663, 667, 547 P.2d 1000, 1003, 128 Cal. Rptr. 888, 891 (1976)).
108. Id. at 852-53, 823 P.2d at 1239, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638 (Mosk, 3., dissenting).
109. Id. at 853, 823 P.2d at 1239, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 853-54, 823 P.2d at 1239-40, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638-39 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
111. 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (holding that unwed father has constitutionally protected parental rights where he participated in raising children, and developed relationship with
children).
112. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 854, 823 P.2d at 1240, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983)).
113. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983)).
114. Id. at 852, 823 P.2d at 1239, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 852-53, 823 P.2d at 1239, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
118. Equitable estoppel prevents a party from employing a defense that was created by
the party's own objectionable behavior. Id. at 853, 823 P.2d at 1239, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
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presumed father.119 If the biological mother or adoptive parents prevented the biological father from becoming a presumed father by denying him access to the child, they must be prevented from using the
biological father's lack of contact with the child as a defense. 20 In
addition to the preference to avoid a constitutional determination
whenever possible, the potential results were determinative for Justice
Mosk in choosing this legal doctrine."V.

A.

ANALYSIS

Kelsey S. Places the BiologicalParents First

An adoption proceeding weighs and balances the competing interests of the birth parents, the adoptive parents, and the child who is
the subject of that proceeding. In recent tradition, courts have focused on the child's interests."-' However, the Kelsey S. court addressed the critical issue of whether the law treats parents equally.- 3
Thus, the court subordinated the child's interests, contrary to the
traditional approach in adoption proceedings."2 4
The traditional best interests standard is grounded upon the
premise that certain individuals, like children, are unable to, or incapable of, taking care of themselves."
Consequently, children need
social institutions designed to safeguard their well-being." 6 Nevertheless, the majority in Kelsey S. seemed to ignore the best interests standard, and rigidly applied the Equal Protection Clause to the rights of
the biological parents without being flexible or sensitive to the child's
needs." 7 The court in Kelsey S. read Stanley v. Illinois"8 and other
United States Supreme Court cases to mean that the due process
rights of the father come first, before any other considerations.- 9
No justifiable reason exists, however, to assume that family relationships are more important to the biological father than they are to
the child. In fact, a child's vulnerability probably makes such relation119. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
121. Id. at 852-54, 823 P.2d at 1239-40, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638-39 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
122. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
123. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 844, 823 P.2d at 1233, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 632.
124. Id.
125. See Rodham, supra note 19, at 493.
126. See id. at 487.
127. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 852, 823 P.2d at 1239, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
128. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
129. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 830-31, 823 P.2d at 1223, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 622.
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ships even more important to the child. 3 ° At a minimum, a child's
interest in either maintaining or terminating the familial relationship
is as important as a parent's: The effects of sending a child back to
"live with complete strangers can be far more devastating than the
disappointment of a parent in the loss of a parent/child
relationship."' 3 '
Courts have long recognized that a minor's status is unique. In
Bellotti v. Baird,'32 the United States Supreme Court stated that the
unique role of the family in our society "requires that constitutional
principles be applied with sensitivity andflexibility to the special needs
of parents and children."'133 Moreover, under circumstances that are
particularly relevant to custody disputes, the best interests of the child
standard is supposed to apply when the family is not able to meet a
child's needs. 34 The Court in Bellotti recognized that children are
protected by the Constitution, but articulated three reasons why children's rights could not be equated with those of adults; (1) their peculiar vulnerability; (2) their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner; and, (3) the importance of the parental role
in child rearing..'
While a father may be entitled to certain protections, the Court
failed to address the question of how these protections can be reconciled with a child's right to remain with the only parents the child has
ever known. Given a reluctance or an inability to resolve this problem, some commentators believe that the child's needs should always
be placed ahead of other interests. 36 In order to meet these needs,
130. George H. Russ, Through the Eyes of a Child, "Gregory K.". A Child's Right to Be
Heard,27 FAM. L.Q. 365, 373 (1993). This vulnerability was eloquently expressed by Justice Levin in his dissent to DeBoer v. Schmidt, where he stated "[it is only because this
child cannot speak for herself that adults can avert their eyes from the pain that she will
suffer." DeBoer v. Schmidt (In re Clausen), 502 N.W. 2d 649, 689 (Mich.) (Levin, J., dissenting), stay denied sub nom. DeBoer v. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 114 S. Ct. 1, and stay denied
sub nom. DeBoer v. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993).
131. Russ, supra note 130, at 385.
132. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
i33. Id. at 634 (emphasis added).

134.

EVA

R. RuBI, THE SuREFm

COURT AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY

165-67 (1986).

135. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 633-39. Since the United States Supreme Court has not defined the child's interest in family life as one of "constitutional magnitude," there is no
uniform, national rule to require courts to protect this interest. Jerry A. Behnke, Comment Pawns or People?: Protectingthe Best Interests of Children in Interstate Custody Disputes, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 728 n.233 (1995).
136. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(2d ed. 1979) (arguing that child's interest in psychological relationships with its caretaker
parents should be protected in custody determination proceedings).
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permanency in parental relationships must be paramount. 13 7 In fact,
one commentator suggests that
the Supreme Court's characterization of parental rights as
fundamental is based on the idea that parents need these
legal rights to protect their children and promote. their best
interests against outside intrusion. When parental rights...
conflict with the independent legal rights of the child, ....
parental rights should no longer be regarded as
fundamental. 38
B. Psychological Bonds Should Be Paramountto Biological Bonds
Undoubtedly, the development of secure emotional ties between
parent and child has long-lasting significant effects. Infants who fail to
form a close bond with any adult are likely to be unable to form enduring, close relationships in later stages of their lives.139 The importance of the opportunity to develop a secure relationship with at least
one parental figure early in childhood has been clearly established."4
However; it has not been proven that this relationship must be between the child and a biological parent; what is important is the psychological bond with a parental figure."' Therefore, it is the
psychology, not the biology, of the relationship that is paramount. 42
When a child has been placed with adoptive parents for an extended
period of time, bonds develop that cannot be disturbed without the
same harm that would result from removing a child from a loving biological family. 43
Completely and permanently severing these early relationships
usually disrupts a child's ability to develop any meaningful future
ties.144 Separation and loss at an early age may result in developmental injuries including, but not limited to, uncommitted, Superficial ties
137. Id.
138. Alison M. Brumley, ParentalControl of a Minor'sRight to Sue in FederalCourt, 58'

U. CHi. L. REv. 333, 343 (1991) (citation omitted).
139. See Leslie M. Singer et al., Mother-Infant Attachment in Adoptive Families, 56

CHmD DEv. 1543, 1544, 1550 (1985) (stating that while mother-neonatal bonding is not
necessary, adoption should take place in infancy to facilitate cipse attachment and
bonding).
140. Id. at 1550.
141. See id.
142. See GoiDstnw Er Ai., supra note 136, at 105-11.

143. Russ, supra note 130, at 387.
144. Memorandum from Linda Kreger, Ph.D. to DeBoer Committee for Children's
Right 2 (1993) (regarding psychological effects of transfer of "Baby Jessica" from adoptive
parents to biological parents) (on file with author).
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to people; detachment in relationships; extreme mood swings; difficulties in learning; emotional blocks; and memory suppression.145
According to Mary Beth Seader, vice president of the National
Council for Adoption in Washington, D.C., the number of American
46
infants adopted remains fairly constant at 25,000 to 30,000 annually.'
Ms. Seader also cites a General Accounting Office study which indicates that ten percent of parents who adopted children from outside
the United States did so because they did not trust the permanence of
domestic adoptions. 47 Adoptive parents generally feel that "claims of
biology cannot be deemed to trump invariably the moral claims of
those who entertain no biological connection with the child."' 14 8
The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that biological
14 9
relationships do not determine exclusively the existence of a family.
In analyzing a foster parent's' 50 liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with a foster child, the Court has emphasized the emotional
attachments that arise from daily familial association.' 5 ' This reasoning would apply equally well to adoption cases when the child already
has been placed with the adoptive parents.
In foster care situations, the state removes the child from his or
her biological parent(s) because of neglect or abuse and places the
child with a foster family for board and care on only a temporary basis.' 52 This way foster parents are aware from the beginning that they
are expected to give the child up at a moment's notice.'5 3 In adoption
cases, however, at least one of the child's parents has abandoned the
child or has volunteered to give up the child permanently 54 So while
foster child custody cases are decided under different statutes, the fo-

145. Id. at 1-2.
146. Rhonda Hillbery, Adoptive Parents Fear That Recent Cases Erode Rights, L.A.
TIMEs, Aug. 11, 1993, at A5.
147. Id.
148. Hill, supra note 17, at 420.
149. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 843 (1977).
150. A "foster parent" is defined as "[o]ne who has performed the duties of a parent to
the child of another by rearing the child as his or her own child." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 656 (6th ed. 1990).
151. Smith, 431 U.S. at 844.
AL., supra note 136, at 23-24. See also Rodham, supra note 19, at
Ar
152. GOLDSTEIN
490-92 (The state's interest in protecting children "has long justified state interference with
parental prerogatives and even termination of all parental rights.") Id. at 490.
153. Gos-rnN ET A1., supra note 136, at 24-26.
154. Id. at 22-23.
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cus is similar: to give the child a home, whether temporary or
permanent. 155
Under former California Civil Code section 232, a court hearing
an action to terminate parental rights when a child has been in an outof-home placement supervised by the juvenile court' 5 6 must consider:
(1) whether "return of the child to his parent or parents would be
detrimental to the child"; and (2) whether "the parent or parents have
failed during such period, and are likely to fail in the future" to provide a home for the child, to provide care and control for the child,
and to maintain an adequate parental relationship with the child.' 57
This is equivalent to a finding of unfitness, which is necessary at some
point in the proceedings as a matter of due process before parental
rights may be terminated. 58
In In re Jasmon 0. 59Jasmon's biological father argued that Jasmon's best interests would be served by transferring custody to him,
rather than by terminating his parental rights. 16 However, Justice
Mosk, writing for the majority this time, concluded that detriment to
the child and parental inadequacy warranted termination of the father's parental rights.' 61 Evidence showed that the biological father
had failed to form a substantial bond with Jasmon and that visitation
with her father caused Jasmon great general anxiety, deep separation
anxiety, and depression. 62
Jasmon had been placed in foster care six months after her birth
in 1987 and was seven-and-a-half years old at the time of the California Supreme Court decision in her case.' 63 The court cited Kelsey S.
as it discussed unwed fathers' rights to establish parental relationships,
explaining that while a parent has a fundamental right to maintain the
155. "IT]he child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality,
should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding." UNrED NATiONS CENTRE, supra note 1, at 13.
156. A juvenile court has "special jurisdiction, of a paternal nature, over delinquent,
dependent, and neglected children." BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 867 (6th ed. 1990). This
is in contrast to a "family law" court which is concerned with such subjects as "adoption,
amendment, divorce, separation, paternity, custody, support and child care." I& at 605.
157. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West 1983) (repealed 1994) (current version at CAL.
FAM. CODE § 7828(a)(2) (West 1994)).
158. In re Jasmon 0., 8 Cal. 4th 398, 439, 878 P.2d 1297, 1321, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85, 109
(1994) (Baxter, J., dissenting); Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 850-51, 823 P.2d at 1237, 4 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 636.
159. 8 Cal. 4th 398, 878 P.2d 1297, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 85 (1994).
160. Id. at 407, 878 P.2d at 1299, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 409-10, 878 P.2d at 1301, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89.
163. Id. at 407, 878 P.2d at 1299, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87.

760

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:741

parent-child bond and to the care, custody, and companionship of his
or her child, it is not an absolute right.164 This right may be severed
when necessary to protect a child's welfare. 6 5
This court focused on "balanc[ing] the interest of parents and
children in each other's care and companionship, with the interest of
abandoned and neglected children in finding a secure and stable
home.' 66 While stressing that the child's interest should not be the
sole factor in making placement decisions, 167 the court found that "after a child has spent a substantial period in foster care and attempts at
reunification have proved fruitless, the child's interest in stability outweighs the parent's interest in asserting the right to the custody and
companionship of the child."'1

68

The court held that the trial court

referee had not erred in relying exclusively on evidence that it was not
in the child's best interests to disrupt her psychological bond with her
foster parents. 69
The majority specifically cautioned that this opinion was not "intended to affect proceedings outside the dependency setting, as for
example, in family law custody disputes."' 70 However, the court's rationale easily could be extended to adoption custody cases-it should
be "within the court's discretion to decide that a child's 'interest in
stability has come to outweigh the natural parent's interest in the care,
custody and companionship of the child.''
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 419, 878 P.2d at 1307, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95.
Id.
Id.
d at 419-20, 878 P.2d at 1307-08, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95-96.
Id., 878 P.2d at 1307, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95.
Id. at 414, 878 P.2d at 1304, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92; see, e.g., AmERICAN PsYcHoLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES IN CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS IN DIVORCE PRO.
CEEDINGS 4 (1994). While "[p]arents competing for custody, as well as others, may have
legitimate concerns... the child's best interests must prevail." Id. The focus of a custody
evaluation involves:
(a) an assessment of the adults' capacities for parenting, including whatever
knowledge, attributes, skills, and abilities, or lack thereof, are present; (b) an assessment of the psychological functioning and developmental needs of each child
and of the wishes of each child where appropriate; and (c) an assessment of the
functional ability of each parent to meet these needs, including an evaluation of
the interaction between each adult and child.
Id
170. Jasmon 0., 8 Cal. 4th at 422, 878 P.2d at 1309, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97.
171. Id. at 419, 878 P.2d at 1307, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95. An interesting analytical experiment concerns how the Kelsey S. court would apply the Jasmon 0. standard to its facts and
vice versa. If the Kelsey S. court were faced with the facts in Jasmon 0. in an adoption
custody case-rather than a dependency case-the court most likely would focus on the
biological father's constitutional rights to determine whether he had demonstrated a full
commitment, reasonable under the circumstances, to his parental responsibilities. Based
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The emotional bonds formed between children and their parental
figures are particularly important when there are postplacement custody changes. Emotional and psychological attachments develop between a child and parent in a very short period of time.172 According
to psychiatric professionals, removing a child from the only parents he
or she has ever known, substantially after placement, is not only traumatic and painful for the 'child, but may cause permanent psychological damage as well. 73 "In this respect California law turns the
conventional function of the adoption system-to serve the child's
best interests-on its head."' 74 Postplacement changes in custody can
harm the child-the very person the adoption system is designed to
protect.
Furthermore, the current system treats adoptive parents like second-class citizens. 75 Authorities expect them to be able to turn a
child over at a moment's notice-something society would find unfathomable in the case of a biological parent. 76 Yet adoptive parents
are not secondary citizens; they have-been screened as fit parents by
either a state agency or a private, state-licensed agency. 77 They have
provided support and care, and in most cases, have become the psychological parent to the child. In addition, psychologists note that a
child is likely to be traumatized if custody*changes. 78 Therefore, the
adoptive parents with whom the child has been living would seem to
upon the facts presented in Jasmon 0. -in which the father repeatedly attempted but was
unable to develop a bond with his child-it appears possible that the court may have found
his behavior sufficient to constitute a full commitment to his responsibilities.
Alternatively, if the Jasmon 0. court applied its standard for dependency cases to the
facts presented in Kelsey S., the child's best interests would be balanced against the biological father's constitutional rights. Applying this test, the two-and-a-half-year-old child's interest in stability would possibly outweigh the father's interest in asserting the right to the
custody and companionship of his child. Thus, had either court applied its standard to the
facts of the other case, a different result would probably have been rendered in each case.
172. "A psychological parent-child relationship equivalent to that between biological
parent and child may develop between unrelated persons in as little as one year." Behnke,
supra note 135, at 716 n.189.
173. GoLDsmmn ET AL., supra note 136, at 33-34; Janet H. Dickson, The Emerging
Rights of Adoptive Parents" Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. Rnv. 917, 978 (1991).
174. Dickson, supra note 173, at 978-79.
175. Id. at 982. "California law also unjustifiably casts adoptors in the role of unwilling,
unknowing temporary babysitters." Id. at 979.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 982.
178. See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text; see also Comment, Adoption: Psychological Parenthoodas the ControllingFactor in Determining the Best Interests of the
Child, 26 RUrGERS L. Rv. 693 (1973) (arguing that psychological parenthood rather than
genetic parenthood be controlling factor in determining child's best interests).
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be the better candidates when considering the child's interest in a custody dispute. 7 9
The only thing that tips the scale in favor of the biological parent
is the genetic tie to the child. 1' ° The California Supreme Court, however, has said that biological ties alone are insufficient to determine
custody. 181 While a biological father has a unique chance to build a
psychological tie with his child,' if the child has been placed with
adoptive parents at an early age, the adoptive parents have the same
chance to build emotional ties that are as significant as biological
ones. 18
C. Future Uncertainty
As noted above, Justice Mosk viewed the majority's decision as
creating needless uncertainty that will work to the "disadvantage of all
parties-but especially the child."''84 This uncertainty is especially apparent in determining the biological father's rights. The majority
stated that "[o]nce the father knows or reasonably should know of the
pregnancy, he must promptly attempt to assume his parental responsibilities as fully as the mother will allow and his circumstances permit." 8 But it could be several years before a father either becomes
aware of the pregnancy or achieves circumstances allowing him to
care for a child. This test leaves an adopted child's status uncertain
for an indefinite period.
While Justice Mosk's dissent reflected his concern for the welfare
of the child,' it does not go far enough. Fundamentally, Justice
Mosk based his reasoning on the premise that as long as an alternate
legal theory was available to decide an issue, "[ilt is settled law that
we should not reach constitutional questions .. ,,"7 Therefore, even
if Justice Mosk's position had prevailed, courts would not have been
required to place a child's interests above a biological parent's. However, if we are truly concerned with a child's welfare, we must have a
179. Dickson, supra note 173, at 982.
180. Id.
181. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 838, 823 P.2d at 1228, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627 (citing In re
Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990), rev'd, 570
N.Y.S.2d 604 (1991), for New York high court's analysis of U.S. Supreme Court decisions).
182. Id.
183. Dickson, supra note 173, at 983.
184. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 852, 823 P.2d at 1239, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
185. Id. at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236-37, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635-36.
186. Id. at 852, 823 P.2d at 1239, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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legal doctrine that places a child's interests ahead of any other party's.

Justice Mosk's dissent fell short because it failed to call for such a
doctrine-in truth it did little to dissuade courts from viewing children
as nothing more than genetic property.lee
D.

Post-KelseyS.

1. Legislation
The Kelsey S. decision has prompted movement for reform of
state adoption laws. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws has initiated drafting a model act on adoption to
help standardize state laws; this movement has been prompted in part
by vague state laws regarding fathers' rights. 8 9 Joan Hollinger, the
nation's foremost expert on adoption, 190 is working currently with a
committee to draft the nation's Uniform Adoption Act.191 This proposed act is intended to promote the welfare of children involved in
adoption. The act has three primary concerns: (1) protect birth parents from unwarranted termination of their parental rights; (2) require
expedited hearings for all adoptions; and, (3) appoint a legal advocate
for children whose well-being is threatened by protracted or contested
adoption proceedings. 192 Ms. Hollinger, along with eighteen other experts in family and constitutional law, wrote an amicus brief to the
United States Supreme Court in the recent "Baby Jessica"'1 93 case, 194
arguing that the child had "an independent liberty interest in maintaining her ties to the only family she had ever known, the family created by her would-be adoptive parents."'' 9
188. Once a child has been with an adoptive family for an extended period, the child is
better off remaining with that family. However, placing the child's interests first does not
prevent a court from deciding that a child is better off with a biological parent. A court
must base its decision on the facts of a given situation. The critical distinction is, therefore,
that in making its decision, a court should consider what is best for the child.
189. See Gretchen Kell, She Wrote the Book- Hollinger'sStudies Will Be at Center Stage
as We Enter a New Era in Adoption Laws 1, 8 (1994); Hillbery, supra note 146, at AS.
190. Kell, supra note 189, at 1.
191. Id.The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws voted on
the committee's final draft in the summer of 1994. It was approved and will be submitted
to the states with a request that they enact it. Id. at 8. The American Bar Association
House of Delegates is scheduled to vote on the act at its 1995 midyear meeting. Mark
Hansen, Fears of the Heart, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 58, 60.
192. Kell, supra note 189, at 1, 8.
193. DeBoer v. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 114 S.Ct. 1 (1993).
194. Kell, supra note 189, at 8. Citing interstate jurisdictional rules it did not wish to
address, the U.S. Supreme Court never granted certiorari. Id.For a complete discussion
of interstate jurisdictional concerns in custody cases, see Behnke, supra note 135.
195. Kell, supra note 189, at S.
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In addition, The DeBoer Committee for the Rights of the
Child' 9 6 has organized efforts to persuade state legislators-including
those in California97-lo amend state laws to provide adoptive parents with stronger legal standing in adoption cases, and to incorporate
the best interests standards into custody decisions. 98 The committee's mission is to Work for the protection of children through legislative and judicial reform, and to "urge the courts to hold the best
interest of the child above all other considerations."' 199
In California, a bill authored and proposed by State Senator
Charles Calderon would give unwed fathers ninety days after birth to
begin "showing concern" and gain custody. 2°° This bill would both
broaden unwed biological fathers' rights while at the same time narrow those rights by giving these unwed fathers up to ninety days after
the birth to begin showing concern and thereby gain custody.20 ' In
contrast, the Kelsey S. ruling requires that such concern be shown as
soon as the father knows or should know about the pregnancy. 2° If
the father knows about the pregnancy early-for example, during the
first trimester of the pregnancy-the California proposal would give
the father up to three months after the child's birth, potentially one
year longer than Kelsey S. would have required. If, on the other hand,
the father does not discover the child's existence until more than
ninety days after birth, the father will have no case-unlike the standard implemented under Kelsey S.
2. Cases
In re Michael B.20 3 was the first case decided after the California
courts wrote Kelsey S.2 14 As a result of the Kelsey S. decision, Peggy
and John Stenbeck may have to return their two-and-one-half-year196. The DeBoer Committee for Children's Rights was formed in 1993 out of concern
for a two-year-old girl from Ann Arbor, Michigan, who faced being removed from the only
home and parents she had ever known. Mission Statement, HEAR MY VoIcE (The DeBoer
Committee for Children's Rights), at 1 (Oct. 1993) [hereinafter Mission Statement].
197. Minutes of Meeting, DeBoer Committee for Children's Rights, Orange County/Los
Angeles Chapter 2 (Feb. 5, 1994) (on file with author).
198. Hillbery, supra note 146, at A5.
199. Mission Statement, supra note 196, at 1.
200. Tony Perry, Adoption Battle Raises Painful Questions, L.A. TiMiES, Aug. 7, 1993, at
Al, A22 [hereinafter Perry, Adoption Battle].
201. Id.
202. See Kelsey S., 1 Cal: 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at'1236-37, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635-36.
203. 8 Cal. App. 4th 1698, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 290 (1992).
204. Tony Perry, Unwed Father May Halt Custody Bid Over Concern for Son, L.A.
TiMEs, Oct. 20, 1993, at A3 [hereinafter Perry, Unwed Father].
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old adopted son Michael to Mark King, his biological father.205
, King
36
is a high school dropout with a history of drug and alcohol abuse.2
He was twenty-one years old when he impregnated Michael's mother,
who was only fifteen at the time?- 7 Although King initially agreed to
the adoption, he later changed his mind while recuperating from an
attempted suicide.2 8 While King has indicated that he may not press
for custody if it causes his son additional trauma, he has yet to decide
whether he will appeal the initial ruling that gave the Stenbecks temporary guardianship.2°9
In In re Raquel Marie X. ,210 the New York Court of Appeals held
that unwed fathers have the right to prevent their child's adoption if
they are (1) willing to assume custody of the child, and (2) promptly
manifest parental responsibility. 211 This holding resulted in removing
a child from her home of two years with her adoptive parents and
returning the child to her biological father.212 The uncertainty that
Justice Mosk foresaw in Kelsey S.213 became a reality in this case.
Justice Armand Arabian, part of the Kelsey S.214 majority, held
differently in In re ZachariaD.215 Justice Arabian felt that the idea of
returning the child to an "indifferent" father who did not assert his
parental claim until the child was over a year old "elevates the rights
of a biological father above the child's interest in stability and permanency ....
,216 Here, after the biological father failed to come forward
for more than a year after the child was born, the adoptive parents
were allowed to finalize Zacharia's adoption. 217 The biological father
challenged the adoption, alleging that he was unaware he was the father until that time.218 He would have met the Kelsey S. test by coming forward to demonstrate a parental commitment as soon as he
205. Perry, Adoption Battle, supra note 200, at A22.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.; Perry, Unwed Father,supr note 204, at A3, A19.
209. Perry, Unwed Father,supra note 204, at A3.
210. 559 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990), rev'd, 173 A.D.2d 709,570
N.Y.S.2d 604 (1991).
211. Id. at 424.
212. Id. at 429.
213. See supra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
214. 1 Cal. 4th 816, 823 P.2d 1216, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615 (1992).
215. 6 Cal. 4th 435, 862 P.2d 751, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 751 (1993).
216. See id. at 454, 862 P.2d at 764, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764; The Child Has an Interest,
Too, supra note 9, at B6.
217. The Child Has an Interes4 Too, supra note 9, at B 6.
218. Id.
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learned of the pregnancy. 219 Since the biological father later lost his
parental rights after a probation violation stemming from a felony
drug conviction,2 0 the court was probably acting in the child's best
interests. Nonetheless they were not determining this case in the
manner prescribed in Kelsey S. After an adoption has been finalized,
adoptive parents should have a higher degree of certainty that their
relationship with the child will no longer be at risk.
3. A new direction
Robert Fellmeth, a law professor at the University of San Diego
and director of the Children's Advocacy Institute, expressed concern
that the Kelsey S.decision is "dangerous" both to the Stenbecks and
to other prospective adoptive parents. 221 Professor Fellmeth interprets the Kelsey S. decision as a regression from society's current "paternalistic attitude of protecting children to the 19th-Century view
that children are property." 22 At the very least, Professor Fellmeth
hopes for a legislative response to the Kelsey S. ruling that would restore some version of the best interests standard.2
The Kelsey S. majority left time limits regarding the biological
father's opportunity to come forward an open question. By requiring
that the biological father demonstrate parental responsibility either as
soon as he learns of, or as soon as he should reasonably know of, the
pregnancy,' the court failed to acknowledge that this could be a long
period of time, especially to a child. What if the father does not learn
that he is the natural father until after the baby is born? How much
time can elapse after the baby has been placed with an adoptive family? What if the child is three, six, or ten years old? By more clearly
defining the time during which a biological father must assert his
rights, the court could have prevented needless uncertainty.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Adoption custody disputes involve the conflicting interests of the
state, the child's biological parents, the prospective adoptive parents,
and of course, the child, who is at the heart of the dispute. Each party
has strong interests in the outcome of the case. In addition, adoption
219. Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

The Child Has an Interest, Too, supra note 9, at B6.
See Perry, Adoption Battle, supra note 200, at A22.
Id.
lId
Kelsey S., 1 Cal. 4th at 849, 823 P.2d at 1236, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 635.
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custody disputes involve deeply felt emotions. These decisions,
although dramatically affecting the home and family, have the greatest
impact upon the children themselves. Children develop bonds quickly
and these bonds, whether developed with the adoptive or the birth
parents, should not be ripped apart so casually. The California
Supreme Court's decision in Kelsey S. 25 placed the rights of the birth
father before the rights of the child. The decision gave little consideration to the child's right to remain with the parents with whom she
had already bonded. The court should have, at the very least, given
the child's rights equal weight with those granted to the biological
parent.
There is an important need for certainty and finality in adoption
proceedings. Unfortunately, California law does not recognize the
harm in removing a child from an adoptive home after the child has
developed close bonds. 22 By creating expedited adoption procedures, like those proposed by Hollinger's Uniform Adoption Act,227
we can minimize this harm.
The rights of prospective adoptive parents must be reconciled
with the state's interest in protecting the rights of the natural parents.
Above all, if custody determination ultimately is to secure the welfare
of the child, courts must first look to the best interests of the child.
Brooke Ashlee Gershon*

225. 1 Cal. 4th 816, 823 P.2d 1216, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615.
226. This could happen even as much as three years after birth and initial placement, as

in Kelsey S.
227. The Act was finalized in early August 1994 and is being reviewed by the American
Bar Association. Adoption Cases Spur Children's Welfare Act, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1994,
at E3; Hansen, supra note 191, at 58-59.
* This Note is dedicated in loving memory to my grandmother Kitty Boone.
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